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"riverrun, past Eve and Adam's. from swerve of shore to bend of bay,
brings us by a commodius vicus of recirculation back to Howth Castle
and Environs" (Finnegans Wake, p. 3)
The reader, any reader's, encounter with James Joyce, is traumatic, when
confronted already in the first paragraph of Joyce's last novel, with a flood
that has the appearance of "into-the-midst-of-things" opening, yet most of
which is almost totally incomprehensible. Joyce, consensually believed to
be a revolutionary genius of modernism in literature, whose writing has
many ardent fans but is hard to love, yet presents to its reader an
insurmountable challenge of understanding.
What does incomprehensibility have to do with genius? Kant, in his
aesthetics warned against "original nonsense" yet also described the genius
as one whose creation cannot be deciphered by others, nor even motivated
by the genius himself. Towards the end of his seminar of 1976, dedicated
to Joyce, Jacques Lacan concludes that "not only is the Joycean text
teeming with enigmas, but it could be said that he played on that, in the
knowledge that there would be joyceans for two or three hundred years.
These people are occupied uniquely with resolving the enigmas - namely,
at least, why Joyce put it in that way" (p. 62). Although Joyce's is a writing
that offers no foothold for the interpreter, its unreadability, rather than
having a voiding effect, appears to carry particular literary interest for
generations of critics. Joyce, with his unique artistic practice can indeed
epitomize the paradox of the genius as it looms in philosophical aesthetic
discussions: being well-acquainted with artistic traditions, Joyce employs
forms that are part of the training of artists (figurative language, narrative
structures, etc.), yet, at the same time Joyce activates material that
transcends all known concepts and schemes of understanding, and in
Finnegans Wake he even transgresses the confines of any known language.
Joyce is historically and artistically distant from the genius, as
understood by Kant in the context of IS,h century's aesthetics, yet Joyce
realizes the paradox of the genius who produces the impossible thing that is
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both detenninate in fonn and indetenninate in "material"', free of rule and
yet, a meaningful rule dwells in it to be revealed by others.2 If we follow
the implications of Lacan's portraiture of him, Joyce may also seem to
undennine some of the fundamental tenets Kant had about artistic geniuses,
primarily the idea that the original indetenninate law with which the genius
acts, can be codified into a communicable rule for the school of artists
following him. From what is reflected in Lacan's words quoted above, the
hiatus between whatever directs the genius creative act and the attempt of
Joyceans to understand or put his example into action, is unbridgeable.
Joyce is not likely to be understood, no matter how much time goes by, no
matter how many critics toil over the deciphennent of his work. Thus,
while Joyce is a Kantian genius who creates something previously
unknown to the readers of literature, he is non-Kantian, if we follow the
general orientation of commentators on Kant's aesthetics, in the sense that
Joyce, not being decipherable, cannot become exemplary. But is it indeed
so? Does the exemplarity of the work ofgenius entail turning the unknown
rule ofnature into a communicable rule ofart?
Joyce was a writer who could predict in a way what kind of desire his
writing will elicit in others, yet Joyce is a unique case in his kind of address
to his reader, in that he tricks his readers to look for meaningfulness in the
"wrong place". Yet, I would claim, that even in that Joyce represents
something typical of the genius: that had the endeavor to "translate" the
genius' work into a meaningful message or to trace the genius' resources,
succeeded, the uniqueness of the work would be missed and the fervor of
the critics would extinguish. Thus, Joyce's case points at the fact that the
genius' exemplarity, the aptness of his work to serve as a model for others,
does not involve comprehending or deciphering this work.
This, claims J-A. Miller, a psychoanalyst who follows the work of
Lacan, this disruption between the particular creation of the artist and the
critics' tools for deciphering it, is caused by the fact that the only truth
there is about a subject, is the truth that arises from the subject's relation to
language, and that relation is always traumatic. In other words, the
subject's relation to language is particular to that subject (a trauma is not a
I According 10 Kant the genius furnishes "rich material for producls of fine an"; howcver, "processing
this material and giving it!;".,,, requires talent that is academically trained ... " (p. 178). This distinction
between fonn and mailer is "quite unusual within Ihe whole oflhe Third Critique" (Gaschc, p.189)
2 Joyce also realizes the paradox of Ihe genius of modernism as fonnulated by Thieny de Duve. a
contemporary Kantian: Joyce, while composing a texl that breaks all known laws of syntax and
semanlics, thus implementing the modernist imperative of "do whatever" with language or paint, also
creates an exemplary work that meets the mandatory "impossibility of the making" (to use Duchamp's
phrase) of the modernist anist. That is, an absolute mandale is mel by the ultimate idiosyncratic acl with
language. thus producing something that is never a thing-in-general (Dc Duve, 352ff.) and is yet
consequenlial for Ihe world of an.
Lilerulure & Aesthetics 16(1) .July 20(J6, page 311
Rutl. Ro"e,,: A Portmit oft"e Arti.<tlls II Vllllisl.illg Gellius
type of event in reality but a type of psychic registration of an event in
reality) and hence cannot be made sense of in generalized terms, which
explains why the interpreting effort of critics is bound to fail.
It was the genius of Joyce, or of any genius for that matter, to having
been able "to articulate the trauma he received in his encounter with
language, and in that he succeeded to cause the university a trauma"
(Miller, p. II, my translation). No form or concept that comes from the
Other of language (i.e., from language as a universal arsenal of signifiers
into which the subject is introduced to become a speaking subject) can
account for the particular trauma of a subject: there is nothing generalizable
about it. I will claim in this paper that the rule of genius must be kept
indeterminate, uninterpreted, in order for the uniqueness of genius to be
sustained.
Joyce's art is unique: Joyce, claims Miller, wants "to wake literature up
in order to signify its end, to awaken it to something of its structure, its
truth, beyond phantasy, beyond idealization. It will be like crossing the
literary phantasy, toward the real of writing, which is the pure relation to
language'" (9). How can the particularity of Joyce's traumatic encounter
with language, be integrated with the universal call of taking literature
beyond personal phantasy? This is precisely where the uniqueness of
Joyce's genius lies: his traumatic encounter with language, which is
particular to him and hence cannot be universally cracked through the
interpretive endeavors of so many critics, takes the form of a "pure relation
to language", that is, of a formal envelope of the trauma emptied of its
traumatic content. This is how the paradox of Joyce's genius can be
described following Miller: as a pure traumatic form void of concrete
traumatic content. In that Joyce's encounter with language can carry a
meaningful weight for others although this encounter goes beyond the
literary phantasy of joint, shared experiencing. The formal envelope of the
trauma, unique and unknown before the genius, is something that is purely
of the subject, and yet can elicit the interest of the reader.
This dialectic of the particular and the non-particularizable, is, I would
claim, a productive way of characterizing genius and of addressing the
central exegetic contention in Kant's discussion of genius in the Third
Critique, that of "exemplary originality". The dialectic of the particular and
the universal in the genius creation is also exemplified in the case of Joyce
and in this paper the case of Joyce will serve to reveal and highlight some
of the profound dilemmas around Kant's idea of genius. My aim is to show
that at the heart of Kantian discussion of genius lies the paradox of the
particular subject in his traumatic encounter with the language of the Other.
J 'Awaken' here is a play on Fil/I/egal/s Wake.
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It is an encounter that paradoxically stages the genius unconscious
knowledge of how to create this encounter in forms that others can relate
to, yet will always remain "other" to them. Genius' creation can never be
"translated" into a systematic, determinate new rule since the root of a
particular trauma can never be articulated in its own terms but only through
an indirect formation (i.e., the subject is constituted through what cannot be
directly represented, which is why a subject, within psychoanalytic
thinking, is necessarily a subject of the unconscious).
Joyce is taken here to illustrate the fundamental Kantian dilemma of
"exemplary originality" and the link between Kant and Joyce is supported
by Lacan's approach to this case. Lacan who dedicated a whole seminar to
this one writer (making almost no generalization about artists through this
case of Joyce), resists diagnosing him, refuses to treat Joyce as a case.
Joyce is a particular case and a non-particular one at the same time and
hence cannot be diagnosed as diagnosis aims to give a name to one
subject's truth. Joyce, while his literature goes beyond any specific local
meaning of this or other imaginary interpretation attributed to it by critics,
and in that is totally unique, also refuses to be particularized, subjectivized.
I will claim that diagnosing Joyce, that is, turning him into a subject of an
(particular) unconscious, would have undermined the possibility of relating
to him as genius.
The next section will concentrate on the Kantian dilemma and its
interpretations, before going back to the question of Joyce, his genius, and
the enigma of his writing.
II
"fine art cannot itself devise the rule by which it is to bring about its
product. Since, however, a product can never be called art unless it is
preceded by a rule, it must be nature in the subject that gives the rule
to art; in other words, fine art is possible only as the product of
genius" Kant The Critique ojJudgment, (§46, 307-8).
The artistic trade-off between an "autistic" originality and a communicative
relevance to the actual artistic scene of given forms and images, between
"the originality of talent" and the mechanics of "academic correctness" to
purpose (to use Kant's words in §47), appears always to have been on
artists' minds, and it has found many and variable expressions over the
years. Although a world of a difference seems to separate the Homeric bard
from the Romantic free-associationist, the modernist doctrinaire of
"everyone is an artist" from the postmodernist whose originality lies in a
collage of allusions, the formula itself appears to constantly underlie every
artistic production. Only recently, in a gallery talk of a contemporary
tileralll,e & Aeslhelics 16(1) July ~(l06. page 4U
Hul" Ro"p,,: A Porlmil of tile Arli.<1 (IS (I VU/li'</Ii/lg Cpuius
Israeli artist, I came across a new refreshing formulation of this artistic
trade-off when the artist talked about: "being expressive in a non-
whimsical way',4. This is just another way of phrasing the eternal dilemma
detected by Kant, that between uniqueness on the one hand, and conformity
to forms on the other hand.
This is the dilemma of every artist, and its highest instance is to be
found in the practice of the genius, seized between creation and imitation.
The genius produces objects that are conceptually classified as fine art and
as having an artistic purpose, yet at the same time his products go beyond
anything that could be implied by the concept of art at a given moment.
The genius produces objects that present before the imagination material
that is free from all guidance by rules, yet the genius also creates a rule in
this very production. The genius produces what is characterized by an
ultimate originality, not leaning on a model anywhere outside itself, yet it
serves as a model for imitation by others.
Kant's notion of genius thus suggests an air of paradox. Genius is
granted an originality that amounts to an exceptional gift and a uniqueness
that cannot be generalized. Genius is led by nature to create his art; it is
through him that nature gives the rule to art. Further, nature appears
through the genius in the special talent of producing something for which
no determinate rule can be given. The genius' endowment is not a skill that
can be acquired by following a rule, but is described by Kant as an
exceptional, extraordinary talent of the poet who "ventures to give these
sensible expression in a way that goes beyond the limits of
experience ... And it is actually in the art of poetry that the power of
aesthetic ideas can manifest itself to full extent. Considered by itself,
however, this power is actually only a talent (of the imagination)" (§49).
The genius' faculty of the imagination is exemplified in a presentation that
exhibits a concept, yet it prompts so much thought as can never be
comprehended within a determinate concept. The imagination is creative in
the genius' case and it makes reason think more. Genius is not only
endowed with a special gift, the beyond-the-ordinary nature of his gift is
also manifested in the genius' own ignorance regarding the nature of this
gift. Genius is a spontaneous faculty that resists being understood or
explained:
But no Homer or Wieland can show how his ideas, rich in fancy
and yet also in thought, arise and meet in his mind; the reason is
that he himself docs not know, and hence cannot teach it to anyone
clse... Moreover, the artist's skill cannot be communicated but
, In a gallery talk of Maya Cohen-Levi. in Alon-Segev gallery. June 2004
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must be conferred directly on each person by the hand of nature.
And so it dies with him, until some day nature again endows
someone else in the same way ... " (§47, 309).
The creativeness of genius is a faculty that demands and can receive no
interpretation or understanding. Kant's attempt here is to specify the nature
of uniqueness, to articulate the partieular endowment of the genius in order
to account for the creation of beautiful art, reveals is paradoxical air when
juxtaposed with the other side of the genius' picture. Kant also requires that
the genius be trained in the purpose and concepts of art and that his
creation becomes exemplary for others. Genius is a talent for art and as
such it "presupposes a determinate concept of the product, namely, its
purpose" (§49, 186). Presupposing the purpose of art means that the
exceptional faculty of imagination with which the genius is endowed, is
controlled by the demand to exhibit the concept of understanding
associated with art, even if in ways that exceed the determinate nature of
this concept. Genius' activity is guided by a conception of its desired
outcome and the steps to be taken in order to achieve that outcome".5
Furthermore, genius is not only required to know about the purpose of art,
but to be acquainted with a repertory of forms. The rich material provided
by genius for products of fine arts, has to be processed by "giving it form"
which "requires a talent that is academically trained" (§47, 178). To stand
the test of judgment, the work of genius must be academically correct,
rather than renounce all rules of academic constraint.
Genius is not only disciplined by his training and given knowledge, his
work is restrained by another factor: it must have relevance to others. The
most difficult passage regarding this requisite appears in §47: "Since the
artist's natural endowment must give the rule to art, what kind of rule is
this? .. The rule must be abstracted from what the artist has done, i.e., from
the product, which others may use to test their own talent, letting it serve
them as their model... How that is possible is difficult to explain ..." (177-
8). With these words the genius turns out to be a paradoxical entity, both
dwelling outside the domain of rules (a natural transgressor of the rule or
concept) and inside the restraining domain of rules, as he realizes, with this
very same act of creation, a rule to be abstracted by others. This "air of
paradox" is what has mostly preoccupied commentators on Kant around the
theme of genius. The question is, is the unknown rule of nature which
directs the genius' creation, to be somehow transformed into a determinate
rule in order for the work of genius to become cxemplary? How is
5 Guyer. 2003: 125.
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exemplarity to be realized without compromising the unique, indeterminate
achievement of the genius, or, where docs the particularity ofgenius lie?
If we take the example of Joyce, the question is, how can a language
that comes from the Other, be used to give expression to the unique,
unprecedented work of genius, and how can the particular use the genius
makes of language, be made communicable to others? In other words, in
order to think of genius as exceptional vis-a-vis ordinary human beings, the
unique/original core of his creation must be maintained even as his work is
to be been received as meaningful (rather than nonsensical) for others.
III
The products of genius must also be models, i.e., they must be
exemplm~l'; hence, though they do not themselves arise through
imitation, still they must serve others for this, i.e., as a standard or rule
by which to judge. (§46, p. 175)
The degree of incompatibility involved between 'originality' and
'exemplarity' is open to interpretation and ranges from referring to this
double demand as paradoxical (Gammon), to finding no contradiction at all
(Guyer 2003). In this paper I refer to this demand as in need of some
explication.
The function of exemplarity, which the work of genius must fulfill,
raises a twofold difficulty. The first one has to do with the association of
genius to rule: although the genius' practice should be the embodiment of
freedom from law, this freedom is subsumed under a number of constraints
of taste that control and discipline but also enable the creation of the work
of genius. The second difficulty has to do with the determinate nature the
work of genius must assume to become relevant to others: the difficulty
that arises here stems from the fact that the originality of the genius docs
not only give rise to an aping practice in the genius' followers, it cannot be
established as an original work of genius without it. Originality and
exemplarity although described by Kant as equally-weighing demands
from the art of genius, appear to pose contradictory stipulations that dwell
in the same entity, the genius, and account for the power which leads the
genius artist along the road of creation. Genius is led from the forms and
rules dominating the field of art (and exemplified in the genius' necessary
training) to the realization of his natural capacity to freely usc his cognitive
faculties, and further to the eventual usefulness of his creation for others.
That is, genius arises from the field of art, leaves it behind, so to speak,
through his exceptional capacities, and returns to this field through
exemplarity.
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The work of genius is constituted/identified as being outside the domain
of the rules of art (but in the domain of nature), and at the same time, the
work in some sense stores a potential rule that will later be articulated by
others. Philosophical commentaries on Kant propose different strategies for
coping with this complex condition of "exemplary originality". One
strategy takes the path of reconciling these two apparently contradictory
demands through the person of the genius, while the other strategy is that
of unpacking originality from exemplarity, attributing each to a different
agent.
Guyer (1996) claims that exemplarity refers to the "impulse to
originality" and not to the actual product of the genius thus paving the way
for reconciling the "individual's need to define his aesthetic autonomy by
originality and society's interest in preserving its integrity by readily
communicable traditions" (30 I). This clash, claims Guyer, is reconciled in
section §50 when Kant obligates the genius to discipline his rich and
original ideas since "it is necessary that the imagination in its freedom be
commensurate with the lawfulness of the understanding". The requirements
of taste thus "clip the wings" of the artist, obliging him to sacrifice some
imagination and spirit so that understanding and taste can be held tight.
Originality is thus located in the impulse of the artist while exemplarity has
to do with the requirements of taste compromising that impulse, so that the
understanding remains unimpaired. Kant's emphasis on the scholastic,
cultural demands from the artist that discipline his impulse are taken to be
the grounds for viewing the artwork of genius as a locus of compromise. In
a more recent publication Guyer refers to §50 as a shift in Kant's approach
and stresses the fact that while genius invents aesthetic ideas, these satisfY
the exemplary demand in being universally pleasing. That is, exemplarity is
here primarily linked with Kant's notion that successful art has an clement
of contingency or novelty, yet one that is pleasing in ways valid for all
(2003: 128).
Contrary to this idea of reconciling originality and exemplarity within
the genius' person, "exemplary originality" is described by Gammon
(1997) as the making of grounds newly discovered - familiar. That is, the
absolutely original opens the way for a non-original spirit of imitation.
Gammon handles this paradox by following the historical course that the
idea of exemplarity in Kant and other thinkers around his time, has
undergone, thus exposing the variegated meaning that can be ascribed to
exemplarity. This strategy, which I call the historical unpacking of
exemplarity and originality, enables Gammon to attribute exemplarity to
various groups of "others" exhibiting different ways of making use of the
genius' originality. Through a typology of the modes of genial influence,
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and explication of the type of activity each one involves, Gammon shows
that not all exemplarity is a way of re-working an already existing rule
(592) and that the work of genius can become exemplary for others in ways
that range from technical aping to the creation of another genius.6
The idea of historicizing the creation of genius in order to reconcile
exemplarity with originality, is also exemplified in an argument such as
Steinbrenner who addresses, after Danto, the theme of the unimaginability
of future art as owing to the originality of creation. Unlike Kant's idea of
spontaneous creation, Steinbrenner notes that artists work under the
pressure of constantly coming up with something new. This constant
demand drives artists to produce original work making us disabled
regarding the imagining of the particular new artwork to appear in the
future. Steinbrenner links Danto's unimaginable with Kant's genius by
arguing that for Kant exemplarity has an institutional streak, that the
artwork is exemplary in being a model for later schools or members of the
art world. Thus, in addition to the rule-giving genius, the exemplary rests
on the constitution of a school and as such, the essence of the work as
exemplary, will first show itself only in future history. The exemplary
characteristics of the work are not known to the genius, because they will
show their face in the future, which is why the rule of the genius is not
communicable. The genius "cannot exist without a historical framework",
thus reconciling "exemplary originality" by postponing the exemplarity to
the unimaginable art of the future.
Whether exemplary originality is solved by keeping the two ends apart
or by reconciling them, it is clear that these strategies are fuelled by the
need to account for the move from determinateness to indeterminateness
(and vice versa), to locate where the uniqueness of the genius is maintained
without compromising its potential consequence for the work of others.
However, the attempt to reconcile the place of exemplarity and originality
within the artist, which in a way considers the original standing of genius
as already combining acquaintance with forms with a drive to express or
bring into art exceptional material and unique forms, does compromise the
uniqueness of genius. Genius is here presented as never actually leaving,
through the path of creation, the language of the Other; genius is a locus of
" "Ilistorical" in the cootext of Kant. has a specific status. Allhough Kant mises in the context of genius
some historical considerations (as his thesis regarding the "end of art", §47, 177), "e.'emplary originality"
for Kant must refer to the epistemology orthe subject and not to actual historical circumstances, unless
we are already exceeding the confines of the Kantian mode ofthoughl. Guyer (2003) for instance. refers
to historical facts about the stimulating effects genius has on art. as motivated by Kant's very conception
of genius. whose Implication is that the history of art will be one of "constant upheaval in tonns of artistic
success" (132). History is hence relevant inasmuch as it is a logical consequence of epistemology.
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compromise to start with. "Nature in the artist" or "the impulse to
originality" in this context remains inaccessible.
The other philosophical solution seems to compromise the uniqueness
of genius in another way, by making genius recognized as such only after
the effect, once the work of genius has been codified into a communicable
rule for art. It is in relation to an established rule of the school following
genius, that his creation can be truly appraised. Both strategies compromise
the original uniqueness of the artist by bringing his creation into the realm
of the communicable and the understandable. Nature in the artist cannot be
appraised unless passing the press of determination.
IV
The question of where to locate exemplarity vis-it-vis the originality of
genius also implies different ways of addressing the kind ofentity genius is:
should he be regarded as a person with an exceptional psychology? Is he a
structural constituent or a logical universal consequence of a theory of
taste? Is he to be inferred from the non-linear changes in the history of art
or is he the artist retroactively remembered from among the many artists of
the past?
Kant's aesthetics has suggested to commentators that genius designates
the complex relations between artistic form and the audience's response
"both to the concepts the work embodies and to the freedom of the
imagination that it represents and induces in themselves.. " (Guyer,
1996: 157) In other words, the genius, just as the object deemed beautiful or
sublime, is not somebody, a person endowed with certain high mental
capacities, but genius, like beauty, is a way to account for the enactment in
the subject of a "quiekening of cognitive powers". Hence, as the whole
Critique of Judgment is taking place in the subject, and can tell us very
little, if anything about the nature of the object, so the genius is not a kind
of rare mentality to be psychologically explored, but a constitutive requisite
to be philosophically discussed as universal. Guyer opposes the idea that
genius is a "rare talent" and locates genius as the point of harmony between
nature and reason in a judgment of taste, that is, a point where the free play
of imagination and understanding in the artist meets the free play of these
faculties in the audience, in a way that is pleasing to the latter.
Guyer here presents an approach to genius as structural necessity, a
direction further explored by Gasche who refers to genius as a paradoxical
"entity", and claims that "the whole problematic of genius exclusively
concerns 'a happy relation' of the faculties", and it consequently has "a
primarily transcendental thrust." Unlike Guyer who relates the necessity of
genius to produce successful art with the intention ascribed to the activity
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of genius, Gaschc's suggestion stresses Kant's claim that the product of
genius is not accompanied by a conscious intent: the genius knows not how
he came about producing the artwork in a certain way. He does not know
his genius.
It is along these lines that GaschC's idea of the "denuding of the arts of
determinateness" can be read. The determining judgment required by art as
art, has to be stripped of its determining power in order for the power of the
product to be asserted. Pure aesthetic judgments upon the beautiful require
the absence of all determinate concepts, and such an absence for objects of
art must be actively engendered in order for them to be judged beautiful.
Gasche thus calls for a "double denuding": a denuding of the concept
behind the beautiful object design and a denuding of the determining
character of the act of judgment. This denuding can only be the task of the
genius (p. 185). A genius is a necessary condition for producing beautiful
art just as a formula is required for solving an algebraic equation. In order
that no rule would show through a beautiful work of art, the genius
becomes a logical requisite or, without the denuding function fulfilled by
genius, the absence of rule will be interpreted as just the skilful
dissimulation of a rule actually present. But the indetermination required in
order to have beautiful art must be more radical than dissimulation. In the
beautiful arts only an unknown rule is required, a rule that has not been
known before it appears in an individual work of beautiful art, "a rule that
has not yet been codified as a rule" (p. 186). Although an artistic school
can later take the mere form (and not a determining or cognitive form) and
codify rules according to it, the unknown rule indicates that only an entity
called "genius" can accomplish the logical function of rendering the rule
indeterminate.
Beauty can arise from indeterminacy when its source lies in the natural
disposition of the subject producing it. "Thus the sole relevance of genius
in Kant's aesthetics is to solve the paradox posed by the beautiful arts:
namely, the idea that certain products of art can be conformed to a rule
without a definite concept, and hence be beautiful". The paradox of the
exemplary genius is thus solved by assuming the genius' gift of nature to
be a prerequisite for beauty not to be linked with a determinate concept;
genius is the missing link between the determining judgment of art and the
indeterminate judgment of the beautiful in art. The rule eventually codified
from the work of genius, hence cannot be a given rule actually present in
the creation of genius. It is rather something intuited (and abstracted) post
facto from the products of genius by other talented individuals (188). The
genius acts freely, and it is through the genius as a paradoxical entity that
"nature passes into freedom". (187) For Gasche then, genius mediates what
Li'"ralllre &- A"slhe';cs 16( I) .J Illy 2006. page ,17
Ruth ROllen: A Portmit of the Artist tiS a VtllIishing Genius
is impossible to mediate, unless an unsubjectified entity is assumed, to
serve, in many respects, as the "black box" in which and through which the
beautiful in art becomes a possibility.
Some of the commentary on Kant follows a different direction of
stressing the unique cognitive disposition of a subject deserving the name
of genius, as persona, as a personality. This direction is compatible with the
idea that fine art, unlike nature, is a product of a conscious act and of
specialized skill. In this direction, the psychology or empirical dimension
of genius is explored in a way that can either be taken to divert from Kant's
naturally-endowed genius or to follow the idea of a exceptionally skilled
producer of art. Genius must be unique and not universal and hence the
genius as person, must have cognitive or psychological uniqueness. Thus
Allison (200 I), for instance, stresses the powerful imagination essential to
artistic creation, an imagination that even when given to the confining
forms of understanding, is still powerful enough to supply the material for
fine art. Genius, claims Allison, creates what transcends conformity to
taste. Genius is "someone who is blessed with the unteachable ability to
produce coherent imaginative associations" (286), and hence exemplary
originality includes understanding and judgment, together with "an
inventive imagination" as essential components.
The emphasis put here on the genius' cognitive faculty of imagination,
points at the genius, as someone exemplifying exceptional, unique or
extraordinary capacities. 7 Yet such philosophical discussions of genius
reveal the difficulty in generalizing about this entity, whether in terms of
universal psychological traits or in the transcendental temlS of an
epistemic, structural condition. Kant himself, in characterizing the genius
of art in opposition to the genius of science, claims in §47 that "the artist's
skill cannot be communicated but must be conferred directly on each
person by the hand of nature. And so it dies with him ... " (177). That is,
there is something about the genius' that refuses to be generalized in terms
ofa universal 'Genius'. 'The Genius' does not exist, if we take Kant words
here to indicate that every genius is unique in its own way. The genius, as
universal, is an impossible entity since, was he to exist, the very condition
of indeterminacy and originality would have dissolved. At the same time,
at the other end of a particularity that resists generalization, one can detect
a tendency to de-particularize genius. Considering genius to occupy a slot
in a structure, or characterizing him in general cognitive terms of the
7 To this branch of interpretations of genius, also belongs Denis Dutton's review "What is Genius''',
which after the work (of Keith Simonton) on the origins of genius. cxplores the common personality and
mental dispositions of gcniuses in terms such as "inventivc", "introverted", "unconvcntional" and the
like.
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unique harmony genius' accomplishes between imagination and
understanding (demonstrated in aesthetic ideas), indicates that genius,
while a unique creator, is not taken to be a particularized subject. Genius
can become a model for others neither through a generalized notion about
creation, nor by particularizing his specific act of creation into a
communicable rule. It seems that Kant and his commentators do insist on
defining the unique creation of genius without this creation becoming
understood or deciphered.
Philosophical discussions of genius waver regarding the degree of
particularity or universality to be ascribed to the genius. While attempts to
particularize the genius at the moment of his advent or through his unique
creation are problematic since his genius is non-communicable and will
remain so, attempts to universalize genius in terms of cognitive or
psychologieal attributes are problematic because they miss the unique
revelation of genius at the moment of creation. This philosophical
wavering between the particularity and universality of genius, and the
dialectic genius involves in terms of how the name of genius is to be
understood within Kantian aesthetics, may find its explanation in the notion
of vanishing mediatorR proposed by Slavoj Zizek in order to come to
terms with "exasperating abstract reflections on 'dialectical method"', of
Hegel and his later readers (Zizek, 1991: 182). Extricating Zizek's argument
regarding the vanishing mediator from his reading of Hegel, this notion
comes in as a surplus moment that indicates that the second moment of
split (opposition) and the final reconciliation are tied through a dialectical
necessity: the former creates the conditions for the emergence of the latter
(Zizek, 1996:92). The vanishing mediator thus supplies a concrete content
to a given structure whose constituents reveal an unavoidable discrepancy.
Yet the concrete aspect of the vanishing mediator does not tum this factor
into an empirical entity of any kind. The mediator is however "vanishing",
that is, its disappearance is required to establish the terms of the opposition.
The mediator is a particular repressed link that as repressed, can never be
said to exist. To account for this vanishing, one can use as an example the
analogous terms of a 'vanishing point' in visual art. Here, again, the
8 "Vanishing Mediator" is a necessary kernel that must be repressed in order for underslanding to take
place. This vanishing mediator. alleast the concept. can be found In Schelling and is outlined in more
detail in the wurk of Jamesun and Zizek (when they talk about the quadratic structure of lIegel).
The big Other is defined as the locus of the word, a locus always evoked once there is a
work, this third locus which always exists in relationships to the other, small 0, once
there is signifying articulation. This Other as locus but at the same time perpetually
submitted to the question of what guarantees it, is a perpetually vanishing Other and, by
this very fact, one which puts us ourselves in a perpetually vanishing position (Lacan,
seminar VIII, March 1",1961, p. 95.
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vanishing point, disappears into the representation to enable the two-
dimensional image to become a necessary condition for the representation
of three dimensions. The vanishing point is, as if, the repressed, impossible
point, between the two dimensions of the converging lines (in the picture)
and the three dimensions of parallelism (in the represented object), the
relatedness of which is enabled by this impossible point, precisely at its
moment of disappearance.
To think about the genius in like terms would indicate why Gasche's
regards genius as the paradoxical entity that denudes concepts of their
determinacy, thus presenting a radical solution that turns the genius into a
condition for the emergence of beauty in art, although a condition that is
neither abstract (a logical slot in a structure), nor empirical (a psychological
persona). The vanishing mediator is the impossible point in which the
particularity of absolute uniqueness converges with the Otherness of the art
world.
In what follows I will pick up again the case of Joyce, as analyzed by J.
Lacan, to explore the idea of genius as a vanishing mediator, the concrete
core constituting the inner relatedness betwe,en the general rule, the forms
and modes of imaging that come from thc Other: culture, artistic tradition,
the school of art, and the originality of the subject capable of using these
very forms to stir the cognitive faculties in ways that go beyond whatever
can be determinately conceptualized. Genius is the concrete condition that
enables the emergence of beauty in art by indicating the necessary yet
concrete relatedness of the determinate to the indeterminate, the purposive
to the nonpurposive, of art to nature, and by enabling this emergence, the
genius as case, vanishes.
V
For Lacan the case of Joyce, rather than bringing up a literary or artistic
question per se, touches on a psychoanalytic problem, that of "what it
means to write" (p. 58). When someone turns up asking in the name of
some inhibition, to be put in the position of writing, psychoanalysis should
know it is worth looking long and hard into the question of what put this
subject into the writing position. In this sense the path of writing must be
considered a symptom of the writing subject and the turning to the territory
of writing in the name of some inhibition, means that "writing comes from
somewhere other than the signifier" (57), it is where the writing subject
uses language for his own enjoyment.
To describe the symptom of writing is not difficult, since writing is a
priori taken to have a symptomatic core (in the clinic of psychoanalysis,
identifying the symptom with which the being of the subject is tied, in itself
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involves considerable analytic effort). The works of Joyce, as a fact of
writing, can be described pretty straightforwardly. Miller describes the fact
of Joycean writing, "Ie disposittf Joycien" (the Joycean apparatus) in the
following way. Normally, every word is susceptible to different
significations, that are possible more or less forcibly. Departing from the
same sound, multiple senses are possible and writing normally permits to
know which sense is concerned when there is total homophony. With Joyce
multiple senses are treated differently:
This marks the possibility of grinding the sound in order to make a
juice of diverse meanings, a mixture ...This is what Joyce
exploits .... But, at a second moment he makes the initial sound of
the word bring back all the echoes of this word ...
This is then the route: from a word, one obtains other words that
are phonically kin-words and possible effects of sense, while
returning to the first word to modify its sense by condensing words
into it. The resull is Ihat of a signifier of pure neologism. Joyce
writes through an after-effect. .. it is the whole swarm that reverts
10 the initial SI [master-signifier]. (13-14)
This account/diagnosis of Joyce however only formalizes Joyce's
inventive use of language resources and is hence tantamount to the Kantian
idea that genius must be trained in the forms of art and its traditions and
must emerge from them. Yet, Joyce opts for forms whose ultimate effect is
that of dropping the support of meaning and Joyce as genius is the name
that marks the mediating factor between the formal unique use of signs and
the dropping of meaning as a result.
Lacan's seminar focuses not only on the diagnosis of Joyce's
symptomatic writing, but is oriented toward the far-reaching question of
how such a mode of writing represents the particular desire of the subject
Joyce, how can we explain his choice of this path of writing. In what
follows] will trace the way this path of writing reveals the originality of
Joyce, that is, the way in which these forms are tied to Joyce's particular
necessity to be a writer. Yet, to the same extent that the determinate
purpose of art cannot anticipate the way the work of genius will articulate
this purpose, so the forms of language and their purposive meanings as
these come from the Other'!, cannot anticipate the purpose they would serve
a particular writer. This "unimaginable" nature of the work of genius,
Q That is, in order to relate to others (Joyce critics, readcrs) Joyce has to placc his
writing in the Othcr of language as the locus of all signs. This Other, wherefrom the
forms and meanings of language come, is not absolute but vanishes once these forms
become part of the subject's own particular use of language, part of his invention.
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constitutes the panicular core of creation: it manifests a mode of
aniculating the ends of writing, as these serve the creating subject, without
universalizing the genius' path of writing. Lacan's analysis of Joyce hence
does not reveal, at the end, the genius as a panicular subject given to
analysis, but sustains the genius in the vanishing zone of non-panieularity
that yet cannot be universalized. Genius brings together the two ends: of
the panicular enjoyment (i.e., satisfaction, whether pleasurable or
displeasurable) the genius derives from his an, and the universal fonns that
are in the Other; yet the genius is present in neither. It is this necessary
non-panicularity of the vanishing genius in tenns of which we can
understand the way "nature through the subject" is exemplified in the case
of Joyce. It is exemplified in this case because Lacan resists diagnosing
Joyce as a case. The uniqueness of genius cannot be fully aniculated by
codifying the rule of nature in the genius, turning it into a communicable
rule for the use of all. The reasons and the meaning of this intricate status
of Joyce as a symptom of writing, will be funher dealt with below.
The facts of Joycean writing described above, refer to the way the
subject ehooses a language to write in. Yet, says Lacan, the subject in fact
creates a language, "at each moment one gives the language which one
speaks a little prod... It is only living in so far as it creates itself at every
instant. This is why there is no collective unconscious, only panicular
unconsciouses" (52). The fact of writing is hence never just a way to use
the language one speaks but a way to invent language so that it will give
fonn to one's panicular unconscious. Yet, invention relates to something
which is the panicular real thing about the subject, the unique thing that
cannot be universalized in terms of a shared meaning.
Language for psychoanalysis assumes the Other as prior to the subject
and as the locus from which signs originate (or, in other tern1s, it assumes
the Name-of-the-Father as what is responsible for placing the subject in the
social order under the law of the father's interdiction). The uniqueness of
the subject is hence revealed when meaning is panicularized as hole, when
meaning gives way in a unique way to what cannot be fonnulated
meaningfully. That is, the subjcct's panicular being can be revealed in the
ways the subject oversteps the Other, where he by-passes the Name-of-the-
Father. When language is used by a subjeet, it reveals something of this
subjeet concrete desire. When the language of the Other is written by
genius, its meaningfulness gives way to a panicular lack in which the
genius docs not appear as concretely present but as concretely vanishing.
In order to elucidate this point, we should move from the way every
subject invents language while using it, to the genius' way with language.
The genius has the capacity of aniculating the traumatic encounter with
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language by positioning himself in relation to the rule of the Other. That is,
when Kant refers to the genius' ignorance regarding the source of his
unique ideas, he in fact ignores the genius' "other" knowledge, which he
uses to seize his readers through the original invention that comes to him
unknowingly. The genius always knows something of the enjoyment of
others. Every genius, in other words, has something of a God in him: he
assumes the impossible position of the Other of the Other as someone who
knows what the Other wants, what the Other means, what the Other enjoys.
This position of the Other of the Other is non-human in many ways, as it
assumes a subject, a genius, that takes a risk that humans usually do not
take: the genius by-passes the appeasing law of the Father in order to reveal
something about the locus of a hole in language ability to symblize, a locus
that resists signification.
A main thrust of Lacan's seminar on Joyce has to do with the particular
position Joyce takes in relation to the Other. Joyce, who, in 1916, named
his first substantial novel, the autobiographical Portrait of the Artist as a
YOllng Man, immediately gives rise to this quandary regarding his
definitive gesture. Why, "the" artist, with a definite article? This, says
Lacan, is owing to the fact that Joyce considered himself the artist, one that
will keep the pens of critics busy for the next 300 years at least. Why is it
that Joyce attributed such a godly power to his literature? Why is it that in
his writing, from "the Dubliners" to Fimlegans Wake, he keeps referring to
himself as redeemer? Was this a way of marking his enjoyment from
writing? Lacan would claim that Joyce's writing points at him as God the
redeemer precisely because without this writing he would have been
reduced to nothing. Joyce's writing constitutes him as artist, enabling him
to bear a name, to create a name for Joyce, while cutting the reader off any
knowledge regarding the "true nature" of his writing. Joyce considered
himself the redeemer of writing, the creator of a language and as such no
language can explain him. He is God-the-creator who knows something
about the enjoyment of writing and in his act of writing he seals this
enjoyment off from us. Joyce is the genius who knows something about the
ways of language and uses it in order to transcend language and in this act
creates an unbridgeable gap between himsel f and his addressees.
To grasp something of Joyce's link with language, of his particular
encounter with it, his writing should be examined through what it grants
the writer: Joyce's writing locates him within the symbolic dimension and
it constitutes his 'ego', that is, it creates the vase/containing vessel of his
writing, specifically shaped and sized, around what is the originality of
Joyce. Lacan reads Joyce extensively, from his novels to his letters and
daily notes, he reads hundreds of books of criticism dedicated to his
Lirerulllre &: Aeslhetics 16(1) .lilly 2006.I'RgC 53
RUllI Ronen: A Porlmi, oflhe A "is' I/S (J Vnnishing Genius
writing. He departs for a quest into which Joyce himself aimed to trap his
readers, aiming to name the unknown meaning of his writing. Joyce pays
much importance to the esteem his writing gains in the eyes of others. This
need to have readers and critics as constant unchanging and puzzled crowd
before his writer's eyes has to do with Joyce's position regarding the
Name-of-the-Father: he does not assume the word of another as his law; he
is rather the one who establishes the symbolic law for everyone else.
One's father is always the one symbolizing castration vis-a-vis a
natural, godly enjoyment that was only granted the primordial Father.
Phallic, castrated enjoyment, inheritcd by son from father, generation after
generation, symbolizes that the exceptional primordial Father and the
absolute limitless enjoyment lost with him, will always remain outside the
communal, social structure. It is language, structured like the unconscious,
that gives form to the relation between castrated enjoyment and lost
enjoyment, through the signifier: the signifier of castration that eclipses the
mythology of a lost enjoyment. The castration spared from the primordial
Father, is also spared from God as the enjoyment of God, the absolute
Other, is limitless ('God' here docs not take theological implications but
stands for any absolute Other, in whom knowledge of an enjoyment, lost
for the subject, resides). Yet Joyce is a unique subject, says Lacan, as he
forecloses any knowledge of castration. He wants to use the symbolic
language without subjecting himsclf to the law of the Father that would
reduce his enjoyment to that of a castrated subject, of the son. Joyce's
encounter with language begins where writing is not subjected to the law,
to the law of castration.
Yet, there is no denying that U~vsess, with its extensive preoccupation
with Bloom's father, evinces Joyce as rooted in his father even when he
denies it and this is exactly his symptom, his refusal to take on himself the
Name-of-his-Father, through which his encountcr with language would
have been constituted. Joyce's language is a language from which the
father is absent, as can be detected in the fact that Joycc writcs without a
Master-signifier, without a signifier that will determine the meaning and
the location of all other signifiers. The absence of a Master-Signifier is
noticeablc in the fact that Joyce, in his writing, assumcs no definite
knowledge: all frameworks of knowledge are equally posited: languages,
histories, myths, sciences. Moreover, epiphany, the moment of revelation, a
typical moment in the Joycean apparatus especially in the early works, is
linked by Joyce to the most mundane, insignificant, spiritless moments
rather than to a moment of knowledgeable insight. Epiphany is manifested
"in the vulgarity of speech or gesture ... in a dialogue of nothing" (29-30).
Within this writing, with no spirit or knowledge from a "fatherly" source, it
l.ireTUtu," &- Aesthetics 16(1) Jllly 2006, page 54
Ruth Honen: A Port",it of the Artist " .. a Vanishing Genius
is Joyce's name which replaces the Name-of-the-Father, and it is this name
of Joyce that grants his writing a consistency required to make his writing
an original work of genius.
Joyce's father was never a father to him, and Lacan provides evidence
that Joyce chose writing as a way to relate to the father's giving up on him,
delegating the responsibility for raising him to the Jesuits' institute. The
"boozing, practically good-for-nothing father" appears in Ulysess as
someone who changed his name, not being able to hold to the name that
should have symbolized what will pass on from father to son. This father
cannot stand for the paternal law that will place the son in regard to that
law. In this place with no law, where the signifier obeys no imperative, is
where the body is located severed from a body-image (unlike the baby who
sees an integrated image of his fragmented body in the mirror owing to the
look of the Other, his m(O)ther). Joyce gradual movement in his writing
away from sense, his dropping off meaning, is associated by Lacan with the
idea that this subject, Joyce, is lacking a body-image. Thus, writing for
Joyce becomes a critical matter: Joyce's writing not only registers, echoes
the body through images of language, it has to constitute a relation of his
body to language in a way that will sustain his being. The path of writing,
as we see, is a serious matter, supporting the very being of the writing
subject, the creating genius.
This way of accounting for Joyce's writing, can also be viewed as the
psychoanalytic way of formulating the dilemma of genius in terms of a
demand to by-pass the law of the signifier. Psychoanalysis, since Freud has
been primarily a psychoanalysis of the unconscious, assuming the Name-
of-the-Father and unconscious formations as the effects of castration. But
later, psychoanalysis recognized that the Name-of-the-Father can be by-
passed. Such is the writing of Joyce, taking the path of transcending the
unconscious (the signifying formation that presentify what has been lost by
repression), defying the phallic signifier, by-passing the law of the Father
(see Harari, 2002). While the enjoyment of "ordinary" people is castrated,
the enjoyment of God is an absolute one, not split by language, driving
people to try and decipher the nature of this enjoyment that has no limit.
Joyce is a writer who enjoys his writing in this Godly way, without it he
would have been reduced to nothing, to a psychotic, says Lacan. It is for
this reason that the world of the artist must remain forever unknowable,
unimaginable. It is a world that eludes us, going far beyond what can be
our enjoyment from the artist's product of creation; the genius for
producing beautiful art and the taste for judging beautiful art, cannot
involve the same position vis-a-vis the rule. This faint enjoyment of ours,
as appreciators of art, is named 'aesthetic experience' and it predicates the
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spirited action of bringing arsenals of meanings to deciphcr the work of
genius. But the unimaginable enjoyment of Joyce is tied so intimately with
writing that had the interpretive endeavor of appreciators of his work
suceeeded, nothing of Joyee's genius would have remained in the lines he
wrote.
Joyce is the name of a partieular hole in language, it is not the name of a
particular subject, which is why the genius is a paradoxical entity. When
Lacan was asked during his seminar if Joyce was mad, Lacan's retorted
that Joyce had this desire to be an artist that preoccupies everyone, or at
least as many as possible. For Joyce this over-estimation of himself was
supposed to compensate for what was lacking in his estimation for
everyone else, for the esteem that did not return to him from his father's
gaze. His name, Joyce, came in place of the Name-of-the-Father and aimed
to be biggcr of any Master-Signifier. That is, if Joyce did not have writing
to supplant the missing name of the castrating Father who should have
constituted his son as a subject with castrated sexuality, Joyce would have
been psychotic.
This is surely not a diagnosis of a case though, it only says what Joyee
would have been like was he not a genius-writer. If Joyce was 10 be
diagnosed delermina/e1y by Lacan. he would no longer be a genius.
Diagnosing is turning the genius into a subject, giving a name to his
unconscious, to his enjoyment as subject and not as genius. Diagnosis
would have required to classify Joyce in terms that are in the Other and in
which the particular originality of the genius would have vanished. Nature,
claims Lacan in the beginning of his seminar on Joyce, is what disappears
under its name; bearing a name makes nature risk being characterized by
what lies outside nature.
As long as Joyce is not diagnosed, his genius is kept unarticulated but of
real presence: it is nature not bearing a name. But as such genius cannot be
characterized, the hole he creates in the symbolic cannot be particularized.
Genius as the vanishing mediator is a paradoxical entity that cannot be
articulated as subject and that vanishes as an impossibility once the nature
of its originality bears a name.
Joyce acts with language as if one could explicitly articulate all echoes
of a language. He provides the essence of language thereby destroying the
very possibility of assuming knowledge or the very possibility of
interpreting his writing knowledgeably. It is through this maneuver with
language that Joyce turns himself into the subject-supposed to know, so
that all literary experts will struggle with his writing for generations to
come. Yet in taking over the resources of language Joyce gives up on
something else. Lacan wishes to claim that Joyce lacks the fundamental
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imaginary competence, that competence that enables us to construct
meanings, sequences, consistent struetures in language. To clarify the
nature of imaginary competence and the implications of its absence, I will
refer to the role of consistency in Joyce's oeuvre. Consistency is, in
principle, what holds things together and as such is a fictional thing to
which we attribute a real presence. We depend for instance on the
imaginary consistency of our body, treating it as a container or a sack that
holds the inside which we do not see. We are likewise trapped in the
imaginary consistency of language. assuming that it can hold and convey
determinate meanings in a systematic way. Joyce gave up, or gave up
through a forced choice, on this consistency, but he did not simply violate
its imaginary function (if he did, his work would have amounted to original
nonsense at the most). The work of genius cannot be simply described as
transgressive: originality takes a rule that cannot be known, while only an
existent rule can be transgressed. For Joyce, claims Lacan, it is the
language he actually writes that supplies the consistency that the body-
image he lacks should have given him. Consistency is there, but it takes a
real rather than an imaginary presence. Lacan demonstrates that Joyce
lacks imaginary consistency through a story Joyce recounts in The Portrait
of the Artist about an incident in which he was beaten up by his class-
mates. Following the incident Joyce wonders how come he felt nothing
against the boy who initiated this painful beating. Joyce expresses the way
he felt toward his body at that point with a metaphor: he noticed. he says,
that the whole event emptied out, and he himself, was like a fruit peeled
off. Joyce divulges here a strange attitude toward his own body considering
the fact that the body is what gives us shape, protects us. The '1', the sense
of self one has, always depends on the image of one's body while Joyce
remains unaffected by what his body went through, and the incident slides
off him like a peel of a fruit. The violence leaves no trace because there is
no body image to be affected by it. Joyce, like other people, does not know
his body, as one's body is always alien to oneself as one can never fully
identify with it. What we have from our body is the echo it leaves on our
images and forms of language. In Joyce there is no body-image: after being
injured, the I, the ego responsible for the subject's imaginary consistency,
does not pop up to sustain it.
This lack of imaginary consistency attests to the particular encounter of
Joyce with language, the traumatic encounter he articulates in his writing.
Joyce's language is particularized by a hole that marks the missing
consistency yet, at the same time, constitutes and locates the place of this
consistency. Joyce lacks the imaginary consistency that gives an image to
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one's body, but this lack must also take form, otherwise Joyce could not
have become a writing-subject, a genius.
Kant's vanishing mediation of the case of Joyce, reveals a case in which
genius invents language at every moment of using it. Joyce is a particular
genius whose invention is that of going through language while omitting its
imaginary dimension, by-passing the territory of meaning and sense. Joyce
omitted this imaginary consistency but sent off a generation of critics to
search after the meaning of his writing, just as Kant's genius, through
whom the rule of nature appears in art, has sent many generations of
commentators in search of the rule that will reconcile scholastic correctness
with nature in this paradoxical entity.
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